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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, ) 
) BRIEF OF SALT LAKE CITY 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
v. ) 
LARRY HANSEN, ) Case No. 940214-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Priority No. 31 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over criminal appeals from 
Circuit Courts pursuant to §78-2a-3(d), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. A. Issue: Was there sufficient evidence in the 
record to support the jury's conviction? 
B. Standard of Review: The record should be reviewed 
in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's guilty 
verdict. 
1
 The Defendant wrongly classifies this matter as a Priority 
2 case. Since the Defendant is not currently incarcerated (at 
least not for this offense), the correct classification should be 
Priority 3. 
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2. A. Issue: Did certain questions asked of the 
defendant by the prosecutor call to the jurors' attention matters 
which they would not be justified in considering in reaching a 
verdict? 
B. Standard of Review: The jury's verdict should be 
affirmed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that absent any 
improper questions a different result would have occurred. 
3. A. Issue: Were certain statements made by the 
prosecutor in closing argument unfairly prejudicial? 
B. Standard of Review: The jury's verdict should be 
affirmed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that absent any 
prejudicial argument a different result would have occurred. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Salt Lake City Code §12-24-100.A.1. provides in pertinent 
part: 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section 
for any person to operate or be in actual physical control 
of a vehicle within this city if the person has a blood or 
breath alcohol content of .08 percent or greater by weight 
as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree which renders 
the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle within this 
city. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of the defendant for 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and 
driving on a suspended license. The case was tried before a 
jury, the Honorable Commissioner T. Patrick Casey presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 25, 1991, Warren Riggs, an employee of the 
Utah National Guard, was driving northbound on 700 East in Salt 
Lake City, in the vicinity of the intersection with Interstate 80 
(Tr. 12.) 
2. Riggs saw a compact pickup driving in his same 
direction swerving down the road, narrowly avoiding fixed 
obstacles and running a red light. (Tr. 13-16.) 
3. Riggs pursued the pickup and, when it turned off 700 
East at 1700 South, pulled in front of it and forced it to stop. 
(Tr. 18-19.) 
4. Riggs immediately got out of his vehicle and walked 
back to the pickup truck. (Tr. 19.) 
5. Riggs, within literally inches of a man he subsequently 
identified to be the defendant, smelled alcohol on the 
defendant's breath and observed a slurry, drunken speech pattern. 
(Tr. 19-20.) 
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6. Riggs, while not himself a drinker, was familiar with 
the smell and effects of alcohol from frequently serving as a 
designated driver for members of his National Guard unit. (Tr. 
16-17.) 
7. Riggs reached into the pickup and removed the keys from 
the ignition. (Tr. 20.) 
8. The defendant then got out of his vehicle, shouted 
obscenities at Riggs, and staggered away. (Tr. 21-22.) 
9. Riggs flagged down one Salt Lake City Police Officer, 
and two other officers were also called to the scene. (Tr. 23.) 
10. Police officers shortly thereafter went to the home of 
the defendant and found him in bed. (Tr. 23-24.) 
11. The officers escorted the defendant out to the street 
where Riggs was waiting. Riggs identified the defendant as the 
driver of the vehicle. (Tr. 23-24.) 
12. At trial, two of the three police officers involved 
were unavailable for testimony. (Tr. 75-82.) 
13. At trial, during both direct and cross-examinations, 
Riggs told the jury about the erratic and unsafe driving pattern 
of the pickup. (Tr. 13-16 and 24-30.) 
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14. During the trial, Riggs repeatedly and unequivocally, 
even on cross-examination, identified the defendant as the driver 
of the pickup. (Tr. 34.) 
15. Riggs also testified to his familiarity with the smell 
and effects of alcohol and attributed both to the defendant. 
(Tr. 16-17 and 37.) 
16. Counsel for the defendant did not object to Riggs1 lay 
opinion as to the defendant's intoxication while driving the 
pickup and even asked questions about the issue on cross-
examination. (Tr. 16-17 and 37.) 
17. The defendant chose to testify in his own defense 
claiming that he had been only the passenger in the pickup, that 
the actual driver had the usual "couple of beers", and that the 
actual driver happened to look like the defendant. (Tr. 60-72.) 
18. During cross-examination of the defendant, the 
prosecutor asked whether the defendant had made certain prior 
statements about the incident. The prosecutor did not identify 
the source of the alleged statements about which he was 
inquiring. (Tr. 73-82.) 
19. Defendant's counsel objected to the prosecutor asking 
about the statements. Defense counsel claimed that because the 
statements were found in a police report which could not be 
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admitted because of the absence of the officers, even inquiring 
about whether the statements were made was improper. (Tr. 74-
82.) 
20. The Trial Judge, while overruling the objection, 
required the prosecutor to modify the leading form of his 
questions into a more direct form of examination regarding the 
statements. (Tr. 75-82.) 
21. Apparently becoming educated by the objections about 
the subtleties of evidentiary rules, and learning that the 
prosecutor could not introduce the police report, the eventual 
answer from the defendant to the controversial line of 
questioning regarding what the defendant told the police officer 
was: "not to my knowledge." (Tr. 83.) 
22. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued: "Don't 
let him fool you. Don't let the wool be pulled over your eyes 
with this story of going home." (Tr. 99.) 
23. Defense counsel did not object during the entirety of 
the prosecutor's primary closing argument. (Tr. 97-99.) 
24. During his closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly 
attacked the City's case because of the absence of the two police 
officers. In doing so, defense counsel himself pointed out the 
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-:;'.t=*-^  " s own diiDi witness and opined that the 
prosecutor was attempt ino ti. '"pier.. r""! game" with the jury: 
Mr. Lampert has long han, onaggy beard, i ac^ ^ know what 
clothes he was wearing. If I could have gone to him today 
and asked him you bet I would have. Maybe he's with the 
policeman that didn't come here today. Whar w«--- have here 
was Warren telling the police he's got long hair, shaggy 
beard, tan pant-1, whatever and some way, although once again 
we weren't able to figure that out because the officer 
•^ ii't here, some way or another they track down mr. Hansen 
who's in red. It would have been nice for me to be able to 
ask that cop chat arrested him what color pants was he 
wearing? * s he in his pajamasV I think he testified he 
was in hio pajamas. What kind of pants were laying on the 
floor? Were they tan? Were they lev:: - as . . Hansen 
remembers. That's the kind of thin-; -.asking about. 
That's the kind of thing I need the po u c e officer here to 
talk to us about. If the prosecutor is going to meet their 
burden of proving theses charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 
three cops were involved in this. Three police officers, 
Hawks, Sorenson, and the fellow here today. One out of 
three makes it in and they expect to be able to just get a 
conviction? That's shoddy, shoddy work and they are not 
able, and I hope that you will not allow them to play that 
kind of game when we're talking about a citizen and his 
right to a trial. He has a right to have all rhe evidence 
put on there and not have one officer going off to his 
training seminar and another one out of town. That is, 1 
will argue to you that that is totally totally unprofes-
sional and that is enough to find a reasonable doubt because 
we don't know what happened. (Tr. 101-10 2, emphas is added.) 
25. On rebuttal , the prosecutor attacked the defei idai it's 
convenien t. 1.y horget. J" u 1 memor y on the witness stand : 
He goes home, passes out, sends back these other two, gets 
caught it the friendf s' car, this wasn'*: Phil Lampert"'s car. 
This car was somebody else's living in the house. So he 
goes home and crashes. He!s remembered everything pretty 
well up until then. He remembered coming back from Park 
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City and going over to somebody's house and watching Phil 
flrink. Watching thig Qther pergpn flrink, Everything all 
the way up until the officer walks into his room and 
suddenly he can't remember anything about that exchange. He 
can't remember what he said to the officer. While he's 
sitting on the stand, under oath, that's when he forgets. 
The point when that objective presence is there defendant 
forgets. If defendant hadn't forgotten he might have filled 
us in on a lot of things. He might have focused in on what 
happened after that point. What happened after the officer 
showed up, after the arrest. (Tr. 106, emphasis added.) 
26. Defendant's counsel objected, claiming that the 
prosecutor's argument somehow "shifted the burden of proof to the 
defendant." (Tr. 108.) 
27. The Trial Judge overruled the objection, stating his 
opinion that the standard jury instruction regarding the lack of 
weight to be given to counsel argument would be sufficiently 
curative of any problems with the prosecutor's argument. (Tr. 
112-113.) 
28. When the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the 
Court reiterated precisely such an instruction. (Tr. 113.) 
29. The defendant was convicted on both charges. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
supporting the jury's verdict, the defendant's contention on 
appeal that an eyewitness1 face-to-face identification is 
8 
i . .;•'.-'• i--';-:e uo s::rrrrL a conviction is specious at 
best Further.. .  r ; l i t e r a n y hornbook law that lay wi tnesses, 
assuming -... :..
 t . -i:- , •" "y L O the 
obvious physical effects and smell of." alcohol. The proper 
foundation -—.r "  ~A A* u^~n ^nd ollch testimony was ii i:t:i oduced, 
without ^_.^w ,.,. :. , Liie defendant fails to appreciate 
that the City5; -i iv :-q- under - the- influence ^tatut-e sets ru+- a 
bifurcated s t a n a u u ~ ju-.p -~ "!-
j. - uence given a particular blood alcohol content. The other 
por: i -•<!'] cf the statutr-, applicable here,. is the simple f.nu....^  
t J- • ;i-v: * miluence of alcohol to 
the point where he could not: safely drive ,-» . ar. It is not 
possible to dispute in goot: :..;_..,.;. • _. •_ -..- i 
offer-•<-• «-•- ;* roven uy direct eyewitness testimony. 
POINT II. PROPER PROSECUTORIAL QUESTIONING. 
Upon -. .. • ' i^~ • :*-r - " '- ject to 
having his credibility attacked A. iae ••:;, - me:ri^ at attacking 
credibility is bv showincr prior incnns^ .-• - . <• •-• -n. t-,. 
^
v
 -< * .- - / Lxied L U ask the defendant whether he had made 
certain statements •_• the police officers. The prosecutor never 
quoted from, me.. •* •. : •",- ; . .lice 
9 
report as the source for statements inquired about. As such, 
asking the questions did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 
POINT III. CLOSING ARGUMENT PROPRIETY. 
Defendant's counsel waived any claim regarding the 
prosecutor's "don't let him fool you" closing argument by failing 
to object. Further, the "fool you" issue merely goes to the 
inherent incredibility of the defendant's less-than-creative 
completely unsubstantiated alibi. Defense counsel, by referring 
to the defendant's absent alibi witness and the absent police 
officers, opened the door to the prosecutor's fair comment on the 
defendant's forgetfulness regarding his own alibi. The 
prosecutor's conduct was, therefore, not improper. 
POINT IV. HARMLESS ERROR. 
Even if any errors occurred in the proceedings below, their 
total cumulative effect was harmless. Riggs' testimony 
unequivocally established the defendant as the driver of the 
pickup and the fact that the defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol to the extent that he was not driving the pickup safely. 
The sheer mendacity of the defendant's alibi reeks even on the 
printed page. In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, 
almost any error would have been harmless. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TUP: F-VIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT T; SUPPORT 
THE J U R Y ' S GUILTY VERD.1 * ' " 
"In reviewing the sufficiency o :.*-.:. -^.:-
v J inferences reasonably arawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable tv Lh« -jury verdict and 
assume [s] that the jury L--.-J--" i-• 
suppor t the verdict." State v. Wood, 8 L 8 P. „L , ..:J" 
19:r Th- Court should affirun the iury verdict as "long as 
triers -;ie inferences, from 
which findings ct a±^ the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made," State v. Booker,. 
]')8S) ; c:iLt-iI v\ . :roval in Wood, 86b P.^u ai 6/. 
The offense of driving under the influence of alcohol 
requires the iul Lowi.ii'j OIUIILWIILU < >J! proof i 
1 # th e defendant; 
2. was driving a vehicle; 
3 . unde r t" he i n f luence of alcohol ; 
4. to the extent that he could not operate the vehicle 
safely; 
1 1 
5. within the city limits of Salt Lake City. 
(Section 12-24-100.A.1.)2 
The defendant does not dispute that the events in question 
occurred in Salt Lake City. Taking the remaining elements in 
order, there can be no doubt of the sufficiency of the evidence: 
First and second, the defendant was identified by an 
eyewitness as the driver of the pickup. Third, the eyewitness, 
without objection, testified to his familiarity with the smell 
and physical indications of alcohol and intoxication. Fourth, 
the eyewitness testified that the pickup driven by the 
defendant swerved across the road, onto curbs, narrowly avoided 
fixed obstacles and ran a red light; i.e., was being driven 
unsafely. 
It is not reasonably possible to dispute that there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support the juryfs findings. 
Further, on appeal, the defendant has the burden of marshalling 
the evidence to support the jury's decision and showing that it 
was insufficient. See State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, (Utah 
1993). The defendant failed to even attempt this effort. 
2
 Since the parties stipulated that the defendant's driver's 
license had been suspended at the time of the incident, the 
conviction on driving under the influence, by definition, 
automatically proved the guilt of the other charge. 
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Defenda*';- ' --Deal on this issue appears to claim that 
because the eyewitness was not a police officer, and not given 
police officer t • >~ L O whether the 
defendant was under the influence. First, as noted abov-. l he 
defendant waived this argument by tailing to or 
witness's l.t'Sl inii'iiy i ^q<* r\' I i nq alcohol and its effects. Of 
course, it is literally hornbook law thai. - ;. witnesses, upon a 
proper foundation of persei... j--xh - h 
persoi ia] characteristics and physical facts _i^  the appearance of 
intox'.^ai, \r a 1 * *•• -v-"•n -f alcohol Diil« ™ i r .^r ^.Les of 
Eviaence . -, iracd-a. I ^ ^ ^ L . . ^,„ .^.^a^rc- ll^idence §6631 
at Footnote 24 'x interim Ed:z:o'i .upr:: „ir ^  i ^  7 4 ; 
State v. Ellis, 'MP D 2J ^ ^ . . 
r
 * . - - I.-."1' • ::VT such lay opinion uesLimony would only be 
reversed if r h '-. qourr finds that the Trie1. Tudge abused its 
discretion. ~.~-~ - - :u^ibuaic pai:'. . , Kc^ ->.~ iuuah 
1985). Here, Lhe prosecutor adduced a mor^ than adequate 
foundation *:r. support the lay witnesses1 or-
L eqa i* di nq i ui (rx i fat. i on, and no objection was raised. 
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POINT II. 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CROSS-EXAMINATION 
WAS PROPER 
To properly evaluate the defendant's challenge to a 
particular line of the prosecutor's questioning, it is important 
to read the questions and not just the defense counsel's 
objection as provided in the defendant's brief. The initial 
question is found on page 74 at line 21: 
Q: ???? and a police officer came into your bedroom didn't 
he? 
ATD: I'd object to this, your Honor, at this point. I 
think maybe I should do this outside of the presence of the 
Jury. 
The jury was then excused. Only with the jury out of the 
courtroom did defense counsel make the objection referenced on 
page 5 of the defendant's brief. Obviously, because no question 
about defendant's prior statements contained in a police report 
had yet been asked, there could be no prosecutorial misconduct. 
Between pages 75 and 78, with the jury not present, the parties 
discussed the propriety of the prosecutor's anticipated line of 
questioning with the Court. The Court, while declining to 
declare a mistrial or strike the one question on this line asked 
so far, required the prosecutor to use "open-ended questions 
14 
rather than statements of fact that you are asking him to 
confirm." (Tr. 77.) 
The jury was then brought back into the courtroom and the 
following questions occurred: 
ATP: Mr. Hansen, what did you say to the officer in your 
bedroom about your intoxicated state at the time? 
WITNESS: He didn't ask me if I was intoxicated if I can 
remember. 
ATP: What did you say to the officer about your intoxicated 
state at the time? 
WITNESS: I don't recall. 
Q: What did you say to the police officer. . . 
JUDGE: Mr. Fisher and mr. Youngberg, if you'd approach for 
a moment. (Pause) you may proceed, Mr. Fisher. 
ATP: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Hansen, while the officer 
was standing in your bedroom, you spoke to him didn't you? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
Q: One of the things you said to the officer . . . 
ATD: I'm going to object to this, your Honor, once again on 
the same ground. 
JUDGE: Ok. Let's ask the jury to step outside again. I 
want to make sure that we clarify something and we'll bring 
you right back in. I'm sorry for the inconvenience. 
Again, defense counsel objected before the prosecutor could 
even begin to read or reference any alleged prior statement made 
by the defendant. A further discussion between counsel and the 
15 
bench occurred during which the Court clarified its decision that 
questions regarding prior statements should be asked in a non-
leading manner. Further, the Court determined to give a 
clarifying instruction to the jury about the effect of 
objections, unanswered questions and speculation. (Tr. 79-82.) 
Finally, with the jury again present, the last examination 
on this subject occurred: 
ATP: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Hansen, as you were 
speaking to the officer, did you say anything to the police 
officer about his inability to prove that you had been 
driving? 
Witness: Not to my knowledge. 
Defense counsel did not object to this question and the 
prosecutor moved on to a different subject. 
The defendant relies on a decision by the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), and by the Court of 
Appeals in State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993), to 
claim that the prosecutor's questions amounted to reversible 
misconduct. Both Emmett and Palmer involved child sex abuse 
cases where the evidence of guilt was tenuous and the 
prosecutorial misconduct blatant and repeated. In Emmett. in 
addition to several other misconducts, the prosecutor asked 
Emmett on cross-examination "repeatedly" "if he had rehearsed his 
16 
testimony with his attorney." Emmett. 839 P.2d at 786. 
Similarly, in Palmer, the prosecutor asked whether the defendant 
had previously admitted to a third party that he might have 
"inappropriate" feelings for the child subsequently abused. 
Palmer. 860 P.2d at 33 9. Again, this improper question was in 
addition to numerous other prosecutorial misconducts. 
The facts here are completely different. First, on the 
first two out of three allegedly objectionable questions, the 
prosecutor simply never was allowed by defense counsel to make 
the statement which would have been objectionable. The first 
time that the prosecutor neared the subject, defense counsel 
objected after the prosecutor had simply asked if a police 
officer had come into the defendant's bedroom. The second time, 
the defense counsel interrupted the prosecutor before any 
statement at all could be made. Finally, on the third try, 
defense counsel failed to object. 
Thus, none of the harms about which this Court and the 
Supreme Court expressed concerns in Palmer and Emmett could 
possibly have occurred. Moreover, unlike the situations in 
Emmett and Palmer, the prosecutor had actual evidence that the 
defendant had made the statements about which he was inquiring. 
Had it been necessary, such statements could have been admitted 
17 
under any of several theories. First, the prosecutor could have, 
had it been necessary, used the police report to refresh the 
defendant's recollection pursuant to Rule 612, U.R.E. Second, as 
a prior statement by the witness, the statement was admissible 
pursuant to Rule 613, U.R.E. Also, because they were not offered 
to "prove the truth", but rather to impeach credibility, the 
statements were not hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(c). Further, 
the statements were also non-hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1) 
and (2). Thus, this is not the type of situation where a 
prosecutor deliberately oversteps all bounds of fairness to 
concoct, out of thin air, a damaging line of examination which 
leaves an impression or false innuendo of guilt. 
Even if the prosecutor's three questions, mostly unasked and 
all but one (without objection) unanswered, were improper, the 
Court should reserve its analysis of the harmfulness of any error 
in conjunction with its consideration of the entire case. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d at 343. This totality analysis is considered in 
Point IV below. 
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POINT III. 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE MISCONDUCT 
Defendant claims two separate portions of the prosecutor's 
closing argument constituted reversible misconduct. First, 
defense counsel now objects, though he failed to object at trial, 
to the prosecutor's admonition to the jury to "Don't let him fool 
you. Don't let the wool be pulled over your eyes with this story 
of going home." Of course, because no objection to this line of 
argument was raised at trial, it is now waived unless it 
constitutes plain error. State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 
1993). It is obviously not error of any kind. The Utah Supreme 
Court has long recognized the propriety in closing argument of 
one side of a case claiming that the other party's "theories were 
fabricated." Germonto, 868 P.2d at 63. 
Defendant's second claim of error relates to the prosecutor 
calling attention to the conveniently forgetful memory of the 
defendant testifying in his own behalf. (Defendant's Brief, pp. 
6-7). Counsel for the City simply cannot understand defense 
counsel's contention that commenting on a person's forgetfulness, 
once he takes the stand, constitutes a shifting of the burden of 
19 
proof. The Utah Supreme Court has frequently stated that closing 
argument allows counsel broad discretion: 
Counsel for both sides have 'considerably more freedom in 
closing argument' and a 'right to discuss fully from their 
standpoints the evidence and the inferences and deductions 
arising therefrom.' 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992). (Citations 
omitted.) 
Defense counsel contends that the prosecutor's statements in 
this case somehow suggested to the jury "that a defendant bears a 
responsibility to provide evidence in a criminal trial." 
(Defendant's Brief, pp. 12-13.) In fact, the prosecutor's 
statements do nothing of the sort. The prosecutor simply asked 
the jury to infer from the defendant's conveniently forgetful 
memory that the defendant was lying through his teeth, which he 
obviously was. 
Moreover, it was the defense counsel himself who invited 
speculation about what the defendant's own missing alibi witness 
would testify to. Defense counsel said of this missing witness: 
If I could have gone to [the alibi witness] today and ask 
[sic] him you bet I would have. Maybe he's with the 
policeman that didn't come here today. (Tr. 5.) 
The prosecutor's fair comment on the defendant's alibi was 
not misconduct especially in light of the Court's two clarifying 
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instructions regarding the lack of weight the jury should give to 
closing argument. 
POINT IV. 
EVEN IF ANY ERROR IS FOUND, 
IT IS HARMLESS IN LIGHT OF THE 
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF GUILT 
AND THE INHERENT UNBELIEVABILITY 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S ALIBI 
Even if the prosecutor committed any misconduct or any other 
errors were made during the trial, they did not prejudice the 
defendant. The standard for reversal for improper questioning, 
closing argument or prosecutorial misconduct requires that such 
an error be "substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been 
a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Hay. 859 
P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993). (Citations omitted.) In this case, no 
such prejudice could have resulted. First, the three supposedly 
objectionable questions were never really asked. Second, these 
questions were nowhere near as inflammatory, prejudicial or 
unsupported as the questions in Palmer and Emmett. Also, the 
City's case against the defendant was far stronger on its own, 
irrespective of any objectionable matters, than were the state's 
cases in Palmer and Emmett. 
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This case does not involve society's justifiable detestation 
of child molesters and the admittedly shaky testimony of only the 
victims in those two cases. Here, an adult witness, beyond 
reproach, question, doubt or impeachment unequivocally pinned 
every element of the crime of driving under the influence, 
without any objection, on the defendant. 
Finally, the defendant's alibi is almost laughably 
unbelievable. The prosecutor has great latitude in pointing out 
such weaknesses to the jury through cross-examination and closing 
argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's litany of alleged errors, the standard 
recitative from most minor criminal appeals, is for naught. The 
defendant was driving the pickup under the influence of alcohol, 
careering down City streets without any care for anyone who might 
be harmed by his illegal and reprehensible conduct. He had the 
misfortune, and the citizens of Salt Lake City had the good 
fortune, to be stopped by a courageous private citizen heroically 
determined not to tolerate any more carnage caused by drunken 
drivers. 
The citizen's unwavering identification to the jury of the 
defendant and explanation of his unsafe driving patterns, alcohol 
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smell, slurring and staggering is sufficient to render almost any 
error in the trial, even assuming one occurred, harmless. The 
guilt of the defendant is further established by the inherent 
unbelievability of his alibi. 
The prosecutor's questions and closing argument were 
entirely appropriate and unobjectionable. The jury's guilty 
verdict should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -Sed day of December, 1994. 
, •/£ 
BRUCE R. BAIRD~ 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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